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Abstract 
Infrastructure-building has become a focus area in Asia as targeted GDP growth rates climb higher.  Selection of projects 
as PPP projects or pure public sector projects has to be done carefully comparing costs and benefits under both 
scenarios.  Such an approach (value for money) is common in the UK and Australia which have considerable experience 
in PPP projects.    
   
Keywords: Functional Cost Breakdown, PPP projects, Public Sector Comparator, Life Cycle Costing, Value for 
Money 
Introduction – Need for PPPs 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become increasingly popular around the globe and have served as a major route 
for the private sector to own, operate and, thereby, assume risks in what was assumed to be exclusively public sector 
assets.  Just like funding for PPP projects comes from both the public and the private sector, risks of the project have also 
to be carefully divided between the private and the public sector.  The basis of the division will have to be the risk-handling 
and managing competence.  This aspect itself, if well-attended, will translate into better value for money for consumers of 
services produced by PPP projects.  If PPP projects are looked at as merely a way to overcome fiscal constraints, the 
likelihood of their poor implementation and/or complete failure is definitely very high.  Before deciding on the type of PPP 
project; therefore, a basic question has to be answered: 
- Why do we need the project to be designed as a PPP project?  Has the analysis taken into account the alternatives 
that are clearly available – the alternative that this project could completely be in the public or the private sector?  If 
so,  
o What are the estimates of costs and benefits if this project were to be totally in the public sector? 
o What are the estimates of costs and benefits if this project were to be totally in the private sector – more like 
the PFI or Private Finance Initiative in UK.  While one firm may not be in a position to assume risks of a 
long-term project with high capital intensity, there could be different consortiums of private players coming 
together for the purpose of executing the project just like consortiums are formed for funding a project. The 
consortium then sells the services produced to the government. 
Using the Comparator Approach 
European nations, and UK in particular, have been at the forefront of publicizing and using the comparator 
approach wherein the costs and benefits of a PPP project are compared with costs and benefits of the project being totally 
a public sector project.  This kind of analysis overrides the earlier phase wherein most projects were awarded on BOOT or 
BOO terms without analysis by a comparator approach.  The key driver of these projects was access to private capital and 
transfer of near full project risks to the private sector. The form of PPP then usually emphasized both construction and 
maintenance by the private sector as that would minimize bad quality construction risks as well. Some governments 
outrightly preferred the DBFO model – Design, Build, Finance and Operate model to minimize risks in each phase of the 
project.  In return, the governments would either give a capital grant or tax exemptions or guaranteed rate to return to the 
private sector.   Similarly, under a Fixed Price contract with the private party, the risks of procurement costs going up are 
borne entirely by the private sector leaving the public sector to better regulation and providing good business climate for 
private entrepreneurs. 
 
The drive for „value for money‟ has underpinned the second phase of PPP projects in both UK and Australia.  As 
made clear by the Private Finance Panel (PFI) of UK, there are two fundamental requirements for a PFI project: 
i) value for money must be demonstrated for any expenditure by the public sector; and 
ii) the private sector must genuinely assume risk. 
Hence, measurement of value for money becomes extremely crucial and the benchmarks set for comparison 
(public sector comparator), thereby, assume huge significance.  Any error in the estimates for the PSC will translate into 
erroneous value for money estimates.  An evaluation of value for money may be depicted as follows: 
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Fig 1.1 
Source:  Presentation of State Government of Victoria, Department of Treasury & Finance at APEC Conference, 2007 
 
 
As is evident in the above figure, both qualitative and quantitative factors are taken into account for „value for 
money‟ evaluation.  The proposed transfer of risk in any PFI project is subject to external audit and, subsequently, 
ratification by central government (Ball et al., 2000). On the surface, the principle behind risk transfer would appear to be 
fairly straightforward and is a practice commonly used in contracts between private sector companies.  In PFI contracts, 
however, the situation relating to risk transfer has been one of „clearly a continuing level of uncertainty‟ (Broadbent & 
McLaughlin, 1999, p. 106). The House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (2000) inquiry into PFI emphasized that 
risk transfer must be clearly identified, so that government bodies can set out clearly the risks that are being transferred. 
Risk is now a commercial product that is identified, priced and responsibility legally attributed (Centre for Public Services, 
2001). 
How to Add Value: The Application of Value Management 
Good project management is at the base of adding value in PPP projects.  Project management encompasses 
several areas such as scope management, cost management, quality management, risk management, procurement 
management, time management, human resources management, communications management and project integration 
management.  Each of these areas involve key processes such as initiating, planning, executing, monitoring & controlling 
and closing.  All the PPP partners have to sit together and assess which partner has better capacity to undertake which 
process in which knowledge area. The idea is to be able to define and achieve the objectives with the minimum use of 
resources. The different perspective that results from the adoption of this approach encourages the development of more 
creative solutions to problems, potentially eliminating many causes of poor value. Value on projects can potentially be 
undermined by many factors, the most significant being poor project definition. The need to define relevant client 
requirements unambiguously at an early stage has become increasingly critical as the speed of projects gives less 
opportunity for a comprehensive, iterative briefing process. This issue is particularly important on projects with a wide 
range of stakeholders whose diverse requirements will need reconciling and prioritising as part of a briefing process. 
Value management differs from conventional cost reduction in three ways: it aims to achieve the best balance 
between time, cost and quality; it is a multidisciplinary process that involves the whole project team; and its decision-
making process is explicit, accountable and clearly linked to project objectives.  However, value management can be a 
very effective tool for reducing costs while ensuring that the spirit and quality of a project's design is retained. 
The agreed project objectives provide the decision-making framework within which cost-effective design solutions 
are produced. Functions that need to be provided to achieve the objectives are identified, and the project design is 
developed to focus on these requirements, thereby avoiding unnecessary cost. This process enables clients to appreciate 
the value of design and encourages the development of high-quality architectural solutions where these match the client's 
needs.  
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Value for money is a key driver in public-private partnerships. Value for money does not simply equate to 
selecting the cheapest bid or lowest price for an asset; it means opting for the best long-term solution for service delivery. 
It involves analyzing the total long-term costs (life cycle costs) of service delivery and evaluating the concomitant benefits 
to the public at large. When compared to a public sector approach, incremental benefits of PPPs may accrue from: 
speedier implementation of infrastructure projects, better service and coverage, life cycle focus of service delivery/reduced 
life cycle (long-term) costs, improved efficiency and innovation and risk sharing designed to create incentives to succeed. 
Value for money is a key driver in public-private partnerships. Value for money does not simply equate to selecting the 
cheapest bid or lowest price for an asset; it means opting for the best long-term solution for service delivery. 
Life-cycle costing, as opposed to costing during construction stage, then, becomes extremely relevant for project 
appraisal.  It is in this context that DBFO projects are supposed to spur innovation for minimizing costs during the design, 
building, financing and operating stages.  This bundling of services motivates the bidder to pay good attention to quality 
parameters in the design and building stages so as to minimize costs to be incurred during the operating stage.  In that 
sense, the risks of poor construction are transferred from the public authority to the private partner.  In fact, a lot of value 
addition has to do with the ability to avoid the risks of poor performance at every stage of construction. In the longer run, 
DBFO contracts will be seen as the public sector purchasing access to and use of service assets, rather than the 
procurement of a capital asset. At present most involve the latter. In theory, the contractor should take responsibility for 
investing in capital assets, financing that investment and managing the facilities for the local authority. The risk is 
associated with the commitment to supply the service over an extended period for a specified level of payment. The risk is 
transferred to the contractor. In theory no local authority should give undertakings or guarantees in respect of contractor 
obligations and liabilities. If it were to do so, it would simply retain the commercial risk that should be transferred.  
Davis Langdon & Everest (June 2000) gave an example of this in the construction of a building.  
 
 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.davislangdon.com/upload/StaticFiles/EME%20Publications/CostModels/ValueForMoney
_CM_30Jun00.pdf 
Fig. 1.2 
 
Source:http://www.davislangdon.com/upload/StaticFiles/EME%20Publications/CostModels/ValueForMoney_CM_30Jun00.
pdf 
 
Davis Langdon & Everest (June 2000)  in their study found better results in terms of value addition when they did 
activity-wise cost breakdown rather than a traditional cost breakdown.  The cost structure, in their study, under both 
circumstances, was presented as follows: 
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Fig. 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.4 
 
Source:http://www.davislangdon.com/upload/StaticFiles/EME%20Publications/CostModels/ValueForMoney_CM_30Jun00.
pdf 
 
The functional cost breakdown allocated the construction costs activity-wise. It demonstrated that expenditure was 
focused on attracting customers and on operational issues, and that relatively little was spent on encouraging customers 
to increase their expenditure. The study generated more than 200 creative ideas to improve the scheme and, thereby, add 
value to the project. 
 
The Case of Royal Hospital in Northern Ireland 
Responsible for providing trauma care for all of Northern Ireland, the Royal Victoria Hospital is an internationally 
renowned centre of excellence in trauma care.  The agreement, between Royal Hospitals and Hewlett-Packard is one of 
the first to be concluded under the Government's public and private partnership initiative. Under the terms of the 
agreement, Hewlett-Packard, working closely with local distributor Cardiac Services Ltd, will replace all existing clinical 
equipment and computer systems within key operating theatres and the regional intensive care unit. The deal, for a five 
year period, also includes training, maintenance and all consumable items.  
The contract features Hewlett Packard's 'managed equipment services' (MES), which includes asset auditing, 
fully managed medical equipment maintenance, asset ownership transfer coupled with throughput-based financial 
services, and total cost of ownership benchmark studies for clinical equipment. By transferring asset ownership and 
adopting throughput-based financing options - pay-by-use - the Royal Victoria Hospital should reduce the risk of 
ownership of clinical equipment within its anaesthesia directorate, while at the same time greatly improving cash flow.  
The service level agreement has been written in such a way as to ensure maximum availability of equipment to 
clinical practitioners when they require it. This ensures the optimum level of both service and equipment availability for 
clinical practitioners, while increasing transfer of risk to the supplier.  
The key advantages of MES for Royal Hospitals as a way of financing new projects include releasing capital that 
has been locked into existing assets, reduced administration and structural costs, and a lower overall cost of ownership 
over the whole life of equipment.  
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Research on Value for Money (VFM) in Selected Projects 
 
Since India is now embarking on the concept of Value for Money as stated in the Approach Paper to PPPs dated 
Feb 2010, it may be good to see the results of selected projects including their Value for Money measurements. The 
following is a list compiled by Graeme A. Hodge and CarstenGreve (March 2009).  In all these studies, it is evident that 
projects that had not demonstrated value for money ultimately could not produce desired results. 
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Source:  Graeme A. Hodge and CarstenGreve, „ PPPs:  The Passage of Time Permits a Sober Reflection‟, iea economic 
affairs, March 2009, pp 33-39 
Similarly, in the UK, the noticeable PPP failures have been the Metronet, HM Revenue & Customs Estate, NHS 
and Housing.  The National Audit Office (NAO) in the UK analyses in depth cases of public expenditure and levies 
appropriate fines for performance falling short of required standards. For example, Metronet had to pay a fine of 11million 
in April 2004 for poor performance Brief particulars these cases are available in Appendix I.  All these events seemed to 
illustrate a key potential weakness of PPPs. When they involve essential infrastructure that government will not allow to 
fail, it is clear that a high proportion of a project‟s risk remains with the public sector.  
Conclusions 
Value for money in PPP projects should be seen as an important benchmark in evaluating PPP projects.  For 
VFM to bring about good results, a lot of thinking has to go into setting up the criteria for its identification and 
measurement.  Risk transfer is a key element and if this does not take place – such as the cases in UK where the 
government could not let the projects fail, - value for money cannot be achieved.  Besides, estimates for the public sector 
comparator have to be thought of very carefully taking into account life cycle costing.  This is an important learning for 
Governments and multilateral institutions in Asia where infrastructure development is being seen as crucial to maintain 
high growth rates.  
Appendix I 
Private finance initiatives that failed the taxpayerin UK 
Although UK has been the most successful in the generation of PPP projects, the following cases that did not deliver the 
expected results also need to be studied in depth. 
Metronet 
The most spectacular private finance initiative failure was the collapse of Metronet in 2007. The deal between Metronet, 
Tube Lines and Transport for London (TfL) was put together in 2003 to upgrade London's creaking Underground network. 
In 2003 the Metronet consortium began a £17 billion project covering nine out of twelve tube lines. It soon got into 
difficulties. In April 2004, it was fined £11 million for poor performance, but this was just the start.  Further fines followed 
and in June 2007, Metronet, concerned about cost escalation, requested an extraordinary review by the PPP Arbiter. A 
short-term cost overrun of £551 million was predicted, rising to £2 billion by 2010, and this was blamed on additional 
demands made by Transport for London. 
 
But the Arbiter had a different view – most of the cost escalation could be explained by Metronet‟s inefficiency and only a 
small fraction of the requested extra payments would be forthcoming. Faced with huge losses, the company went into 
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administration. The government tried to find private bidders for the Metronet contracts but failed – unsurprisingly given the 
uncertainty concerning costs. The public sector then became responsible for the upgrades and maintenance. Taxpayers 
would now pick up the bill for any cost overruns. Within five years, the Metronet consortium collapsed, costing taxpayers 
£2bn as its functions were taken over by TfL. 
HM Revenue & Customs estate 
The PAC concluded in April that the PFI deal covering ownership and management of 60 per cent of the HMRC's estate is 
also failing to deliver value for money. The 20-year deal signed by Mapeley Steps Contractor in 2001 has cost the 
taxpayer 20 per cent more than expected so far, the PAC said.  
NHS 
Latest estimates suggest that the NHS faces a £65bn bill for 103 new PFI hospitals with an estimated value of £11.3bn at 
the time they were built. The Government says the schemes provide value for money. But some trusts are now handing 
over more than 10 per cent of their annual turnover.  
The inability of either conventional DBFO PFI or traditional NHS procurement processes to meet the majority of NHS 
capital requirements has prompted many commentators to argue that a new financing model is required that can bring 
together the benefits of both without the drawbacks of either. This may be summarised as a more flexible and scalable 
PFI. Scalability is key: the ability to provide efficient and manageable financing from unit and ward level right up to trust 
level. The considerable challenges faced by this new approach will include: unlocking the extensive value currently hidden 
in many trusts' assets; developing and modernising trust facilities, often on a unit by unit basis;  and developing services 
that respond to changing patterns of usage and technology, both sensitively and flexibly.  
Housing 
According to the NAO, more than four-fifths of local authorities' 25 PFI housing projects are over budget. Nearly half are 
running at more than twice the anticipated cost (June 2010 report). And the average delay is two-and-a-half years. 
The traditional approach to health service purchasing has tended to leave trusts with a bitter legacy of high maintenance 
costs, inconsistent support and ineffective replacement programmes. Financial data on the whole-life cost of assets tends 
to be fragmented, often held in different places, or is even simply not collected. As a result, it can be difficult for a trust to 
analyse and control the cost of their assets effectively.  
Source: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/mod-aircraft-deal-worth-163105bn-failed-to-deliver-
2080408.html 
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